How good was Bradley (take 2)?

One of the questions that I keep getting asked about Omar Bradley is: How good a general was he really?

I keep struggling to answer the question not because I don’t think he was an excellent general – he certainly was – but because it’s so hard to put the answer into context.

The truth is, what we require of a general changes greatly depending on the general’s role. Bradley was a peacetime division commander, an army corps commander, an army commander, and finally an army group commander. Each of those jobs is more than a little different.

In terms of training up a division, he had an excellent record, attested to not only by the assignments he was given but by the success of his divisions, most notably the 82^nd Infantry, which was considered highly rated enough to be formed into the elite airborne division. (Obviously, the credit for the division’s achievements go to the cadre of officers and men who took it from an infantry unit to the elite 82^nd Airborne we know of today.) Bradley’s role in reshaping the 28^th Infantry – a National Guard unit that was in terrible shape just before the war – is often overlooked. (I’m guilty of that to some extent myself, giving it pretty short shrift in the biography. The 28^th, incidentally, got badly mauled in Huertgen, and ended up being shifted into a quiet sector for rest – putting it right in the way of the German advance in what became the Battle of the Bulge.)

His results stand in great contrast to Patton’s snarky remark about him having “failed to obtain discipline” at Benning, a line often taken out of context by historians who think that Bradley was some sort of milquetoast pushover who couldn’t organize a garden party. On the contrary, Bradley got results without terrorizing people or aggrandizing himself, something Patton never completely understood. (And in fairness to Patton, that remark was written in a fit of pique toward Bradley. His actual opinion of Bradley was much more complicated and generally complimentary.)

Bradley never led a division in combat, and while we have a lot of testimony about his abilities as a tactician, we really don’t know exactly how well he would have fared at that level. Extrapolating from the advice he appears to have been giving division commanders in Africa and Sicily (and to some extent later), it would appear that the accolades were warranted, but frankly there’s just not enough direct data there about what he said or did to decide whether he would have been X amount better (or worse) than anyone else.

As a corps commander in Africa and Sicily, his record is much clearer. (Corps commanders were responsible for two to three divisions during the war. They would generally determine tactics and troop dispositions in their sector, coordinating the divisions and – most importantly – the allocation of units that weren’t part of the division, say “extra” armor or artillery, etc. These attachments were actually a critical part of the war, something often overlooked by regular historians. Bradley’s flexibility, especially as an army commander, has gone largely unnoticed and uncredited; it’s a shame, because that flexibility was critical to winning the war.)

Bradley’s record as corps commander is fairly good, though on Sicily he’s severely handicapped by an overall plan (and a botched execution) that not only relegated his corps to a secondary position but quite honestly made little sense.

He was army and army group commander in northern Europe. Cobra, the breakout from the peninsula, was literally his plan; he single-handedly devised it. It stands as one of the great Allied operations of World War II. He also revised the Allied plan after the breakout, deciding to send Patton directly after the main German army rather than trying to secure Brest and ports on the Atlantic. That was another key decision in the campaign, one that results in the liberation of France and the destruction of much of the German army. (On the downside, it can also be argued that it contributes to the temporary stalemate at the frontier in late fall and early winter, until the Battle of the Bulge.)

But the real measure of an army and army group commander’s abilities isn’t so much the result of an individual battle but rather the outcome of the war he’s engaged in. You can say Robert E. Lee was a great general handicapped by a, b, and c, but at the end of the day the successful army commander was Grant. And to take Grant’s measure, you simply have to compare him to any of his predecessors.

Bradley, obviously, won the war. Anyone who thinks that was inevitable given the Allied advantages should look first at the results of the original plan for the breakout from Normandy, and then at Market Garden – two failures by any measure. (Both, not coincidentally, led by Montgomery, but that’s another topic.) Examine the campaign in Italy, and then comment on the inevitability of victory in France and Germany.

There’s an old saying to the effect that amateurs evaluating war (and generals) focus on tactics, while professionals focus on logistics and supply. But to really evaluate a modern army group commander, we have to focus on the achievements of his underlings – the army and corps commanders, the division leaders and finally the men themselves. Here Bradley’s record is truly remarkable.

Patton’s achievements in France under Bradley are in direct contrast with his conduct on Sicily under Alexander. Now we all know – because we’ve been told over and over – that Patton is a great general, so perhaps he would have achieved those things without Bradley. How then to account for 1^st Army, whose leader never got anywhere near the accolades that Patton did?

But maybe the best argument for Bradley is actually on the German side of the war. A few minutes examining the relationship between Rommel and Rundstedt shows exactly how difficult the job is, and how easily – and fatally – a war can be lost by a failure of leadership at the highest levels.

So what does, finally, leadership at the highest level consist of?

The ability to bring out the best in others, whether they are geniuses or merely able. The ability to do it with a minimum of distraction, under fire, long enough to achieve a distant goal.

If that’s how you judge a general, I can’t think of anyone better than Omar Bradley.