How good was Bradley (take 2)?
One of the questions that I keep getting asked about Omar
Bradley is: How good a general was he really?
I keep struggling to answer the question not because I don’t
think he was an excellent general – he certainly was – but because it’s so hard
to put the answer into context.
The truth is, what we require of a general changes greatly
depending on the general’s role. Bradley was a peacetime division commander, an
army corps commander, an army commander, and finally an army group commander.
Each of those jobs is more than a little different.
In terms of training up a division, he had an excellent
record, attested to not only by the assignments he was given but by the success
of his divisions, most notably the 82nd Infantry, which was considered
highly rated enough to be formed into the elite airborne division. (Obviously,
the credit for the division’s achievements go to the cadre of officers and men
who took it from an infantry unit to the elite 82nd Airborne we know
of today.) Bradley’s role in reshaping the 28th Infantry – a National
Guard unit that was in terrible shape just before the war – is often
overlooked. (I’m guilty of that to some extent myself, giving it pretty short
shrift in the biography. The 28th, incidentally, got badly mauled in
Huertgen, and ended up being shifted into a quiet sector for rest – putting it
right in the way of the German advance in what became the Battle of the Bulge.)
His results stand in great contrast to Patton’s snarky
remark about him having “failed to obtain discipline” at Benning, a line often
taken out of context by historians who think that Bradley was some sort of milquetoast
pushover who couldn’t organize a garden party. On the contrary, Bradley got
results without terrorizing people or aggrandizing himself, something Patton
never completely understood. (And in fairness to Patton, that remark was
written in a fit of pique toward Bradley. His actual opinion of Bradley was
much more complicated and generally complimentary.)
Bradley never led a division in combat, and while we have a
lot of testimony about his abilities as a tactician, we really don’t know
exactly how well he would have fared at that level. Extrapolating from the
advice he appears to have been giving division commanders in Africa and Sicily
(and to some extent later), it would appear that the accolades were warranted,
but frankly there’s just not enough direct data there about what he said or did
to decide whether he would have been X amount better (or worse) than anyone else.
As a corps commander in Africa and Sicily, his record is much
clearer. (Corps commanders were responsible for two to three divisions during
the war. They would generally determine tactics and troop dispositions in their
sector, coordinating the divisions and – most importantly – the allocation of
units that weren’t part of the division, say “extra” armor or artillery, etc.
These attachments were actually a critical part of the war, something often
overlooked by regular historians. Bradley’s flexibility, especially as an army
commander, has gone largely unnoticed and uncredited; it’s a shame, because
that flexibility was critical to winning the war.)
Bradley’s record as corps commander is fairly good, though
on Sicily he’s severely handicapped by an overall plan (and a botched execution)
that not only relegated his corps to a secondary position but quite honestly
made little sense.
He was army and army group commander in northern Europe.
Cobra, the breakout from the peninsula, was literally his plan; he
single-handedly devised it. It stands as one of the great Allied operations of
World War II. He also revised the Allied plan after the breakout, deciding to send
Patton directly after the main German army rather than trying to secure Brest
and ports on the Atlantic. That was another key decision in the campaign, one
that results in the liberation of France and the destruction of much of the
German army. (On the downside, it can also be argued that it contributes to the
temporary stalemate at the frontier in late fall and early winter, until the
Battle of the Bulge.)
But the real measure of an army and army group commander’s
abilities isn’t so much the result of an individual battle but rather the
outcome of the war he’s engaged in. You can say Robert E. Lee was a great
general handicapped by a, b, and c, but at the end of the day the successful
army commander was Grant. And to take Grant’s measure, you simply have to
compare him to any of his predecessors.
Bradley, obviously, won the war. Anyone who thinks that was
inevitable given the Allied advantages should look first at the results of the
original plan for the breakout from Normandy, and then at Market Garden – two failures
by any measure. (Both, not coincidentally, led by Montgomery, but that’s
another topic.) Examine the campaign in Italy, and then comment on the
inevitability of victory in France and Germany.
There’s an old saying to the effect that amateurs evaluating
war (and generals) focus on tactics, while professionals focus on logistics and
supply. But to really evaluate a modern army group commander, we have to focus
on the achievements of his underlings – the army and corps commanders, the
division leaders and finally the men themselves. Here Bradley’s record is truly
remarkable.
Patton’s achievements in France under Bradley are in direct
contrast with his conduct on Sicily under Alexander. Now we all know – because we’ve
been told over and over – that Patton is a great general, so perhaps he would
have achieved those things without Bradley. How then to account for 1st
Army, whose leader never got anywhere near the accolades that Patton did?
But maybe the best argument for Bradley is actually on the
German side of the war. A few minutes examining the relationship between Rommel
and Rundstedt shows exactly how difficult the job is, and how easily – and fatally
– a war can be lost by a failure of leadership at the highest levels.
So what does, finally, leadership at the highest level
consist of?
The ability to bring out the best in others, whether they
are geniuses or merely able. The ability to do it with a minimum of
distraction, under fire, long enough to achieve a distant goal.
If that’s how you judge a general, I can’t think of anyone
better than Omar Bradley.
