Sicily, 1943 (2)

What did they learn?

A lot.

The World War II allies’ Sicily campaign, which took place seventy years ago this month, had its share of snafus and fubars. Among other things, the allies missed a chance at destroying a significant portion of the German army protecting southern Italy, a failure that quickly came to haunt them in the following months.

On the other hand, a lot of good things did come from that battle. For one, it probably convinced Eisenhower that Bradley was the man he needed to run the D-Day invasion. It also featured the largest beach landings under fire to that point in the war; by some measures, it was even larger than Normandy.

Logistics never get much attention in the history books, but dealing with the sheer size of the American force was a critical learning experience. Sicily was also the place where a significant number of junior NCOs and officers learned how to lead.

Friendly fire incidents directed the allies’ attention to the problem, though there was never a wholly satisfying solution.

Another lesson learned but only partly implemented was the difficulty of using paratroopers to seize significant tactical points early in the battle. On Sicily, paratroopers were blown significantly off course, which kept them from achieving their targets in the initial stages of the battle. Ironically, their unplanned dispersion, along with their courage and ferocity, helped them play a key role as the battle progressed. They would end up having somewhat similar problems in Normandy, though there they were successful in holding key beach exits necessary for the invaders to escape the noose at the sands. (Bradley did adjust their objectives before the battle, scaling them back a bit in response to intelligence reports, but to the end he was an extreme advocate and supporter of paratroop attacks, probably beyond what was practical.)

The conquest of Sicily gave the allies a place to base their planes for the Italian campaign. Close-air support was not yet a perfected science – aside from some early experiments, it wasn’t until France that fighter-bombers started teaming up closely with advancing ground units – but Sicily’s bases extended the range and time that could be covered on the mainland.

How you view Sicily probably depends on whether you think Italy was worth attacking in the first place. I think it was, and while I think the allies could have achieved better results with a more daring plan (and better execution of the plan they stuck themselves with), on the whole, it was a necessary campaign.

And one they won.

Here's a link to the U.S. Army's official history of the campaign:

http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/72-16/72-16.htm