Sicily, 1943

The Bungled Campaign

Some seventy years ago this month, the allies landed on Sicily in one of World War II's largest amphibious assaults. Over the course of the next four or five weeks, they fought a confused and in some cases haphazard campaign against German troops, Italian troops, severe geography, and themselves.

World War II’s Sicily campaign tends to get overlooked, especially by Americans. While it was arguably a necessary stepping stone for an Italian campaign, the very decision to invade Sicily was controversial among the allied leaders at the time. While the allies eventually won the island, it can’t be said that they did so because of any brilliant maneuvering or military leadership. They let a major portion of the German army escape, and functioned with a lack of coordination that could easily have been fatal, had they faced a more determined and better led enemy in the Italians.

Bernard Montgomery, and to some extent his boss Harold Alexander, generally get the bulk of the criticism. Though Alexander in theory was running the show*, Montgomery ended up drawing the invasion plan and calling most of the shots. His slow plodding attack -–I know, easy for me to say – was pretty much typical Montgomery, and anyone who studies it can’t be very surprised by his performance in northern Europe the following year.

Interestingly, George Patton often escapes criticism for his Sicilian campaign. Instead, critics tend to focus on the so-calling slapping incidents, where he attempted to rouse men from hospital beds by humiliating them in front of others.

In the context of the times, Patton’s actions in the hospitals may have been harsh, but they’re certainly understandable. What isn’t understandable was his decision to flaunt Alexander’s orders and Montgomery’s plans, and have half the American force take an end run around the island. While his troops didn’t entirely abandon the British – Bradley’s corps held Montgomery’s mountainous western flank, Patton's end run meant the Americans were in no position to pressure the retreating Germans at Messina.

That could have been done, and presumably would have yielded some results. But for some reason, Patton often gets a pass from most historians. It’s not surprising, really – making the case that Patton was a superb general is a heck of a lot easier if you don’t have to puzzle out what he had in mind there.

On the other hand, Patton's dash was merely the icing on the cake of a tepid plan; even if he'd been available it's possible he would have simply sped the German retreat.

So what might the allies have done?

Invade from the north as well as the south, striking Messina early, cutting off the German retreat.

Admittedly, this would have been a risky move - among other things, the north was probably outside of fighter cover and amphibious landings were still iffy. But it was also a high-stakes plan that would have isolated a significant portion of the German army. (The Italians, one presumes, would have quit in even larger numbers.) If those men didn't live to fight another day in Italy, maybe the entire Italian campaign would have started a lot more smoothly . . .

* Technically Alexander was under Eisenhower, but Alexander was really the one who was supposed to be in charge of the actual invasion force.